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EXPLAINING CORRUPTION:
A COMMON AGENCY APPROACH
BY NORBERT MAIER
Abstract
In many cases, politicians and government officials are forbidden by law
to accept monetary donations from interest groups or other outside
parties as these monetary transfers are thought to cause social
inefficiencies. The empirical literature supports this view as it finds a
negative link between corruption (secret payments to government
officials) and growth. However, banning monetary transfers to
government officials might be discouraged as it is equivalent to
restricting transactions in the market for political decision-making and
inefficiencies can arise exactly because of these constraints. In this
paper, we address the following question: Under which conditions
should the government forbid its officials to accept monetary donations,
even though enforcing such bans is costly and secret transfers still may
occur? In particular, we analyze a common agency game, in which a
government official acts as the common agent of the government and
some third party, and identify some conditions under which banning
economic interactions between the official and the third party is welfare
enhancing. We also explain why secret monetary transfers to
government officials can lead to economic inefficiencies.
Keywords: Corruption, Bribing, Common Agency, Exclusive Dealing,
Hidden Contracting




EGY TÖBBMEGBÍZÓS MEGBÍZÓ-ÜGYNÖK KERETBEN
Összefoglalás
A t￿rvØny nagyon sok esetben megtiltja, hogy a politikusok pØnzadomÆ-
nyokat fogadjanak el Ørdekcsoportokt￿l vagy a privÆtszfØra egyØb sze-
replőitől, mivel ezek a juttatÆsok tÆrsadalmi hatØkonysÆgvesztØshez ve-
zethetnek. Ennek a vØlekedØsnek az empirikus irodalom sem mond ellent,
mivel a vizsgÆlatok a korrupci￿ Øs a gazdasÆgi n￿vekedØs k￿z￿tt negat￿v
kapcsolatot mutatnak ki. MÆsrØszről viszont, a privÆt szfØra szereplőitől
a k￿zigazgatÆsban dolgoz￿knak juttatott pØnzadomÆnyokat nem kellene
megtiltani, hiszen ez a politikai d￿ntØsek piacÆn lØvő tranzakci￿k korlÆ-
tozÆsÆval egyenØrtØkű, Øs Øppen ezeknek a piaci tranzakci￿knak a kor-
lÆtozÆsa vezethet hatØkonysÆgvesztØshez. Dolgozatomban a k￿vetkező
kØrdØsre keresem a vÆlaszt: Milyen feltØtelek mellett kellene a kormÆny-
zatnak megtiltania, hogy az alkalmazottai pØnzadomÆnyokat fogadjanak
el a privÆt szfØra kØpviselőitől, feltØtelezve, hogy egy ilyen tiltÆs betar-
tatÆsa k￿ltsØges, hiszen a pØnzmozgÆsokat titokban lehet tartani. A
problØmÆt egy t￿bbmegb￿z￿s megb￿z￿-￿gyn￿k jÆtØk keretØben elemzem,
amelyben a k￿zigazgatÆsi alkalmazott a kormÆnyzat Øs a privÆt szfØra
kØpviselőjØnek k￿z￿s ￿gyn￿ke, Øs megvizsgÆlom, hogy milyen feltØtelek
mellett n￿veli a k￿zigazgatÆsi alkalmazott Øs a privÆt szfØra k￿z￿tti
pØnzmozgÆsok betiltÆsa a tÆrsadalmi ￿sszhasznot. Ezt k￿vetően rÆmuta-
tok, hogy a k￿zigazgatÆsi alkalmazottaknak titokban fizetett adomÆnyok
hatØkonysÆgvesztØshez vezetnek.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Many of the government’s tasks are delegated to bureaucrats. Bureaucrats -
among others - decide about transfers to supporters, award contracts to private
ﬁrms, collect taxes, issue licences, create government projects or regulations.
These types of decisions have a strong impact on the wellbeing of private ﬁrms
or interest groups and as a result, it is in the latters’ interest to try to inﬂu-
ence bureaucrats’ decisions. The most eﬀective ways for this are collecting and
sharing information with them1 or oﬀering monetary donations.
These monetary donations can be of the form of campaign ﬁnancing contri-
butions, lobbying money or direct monetary transfers in exchange for favorable
decisions, and are often restricted by the law as they might distort bureaucrats’
ex-ante optimal decisions. For example, campaign ﬁnancing is constrained in
many countries, lobbying is allowed in the United States, but not specially wel-
come in Europe, etc. In turn, direct monetary payments to bureaucrats are
considered almost always illegal, but they still occur secretly. These instances
of hidden monetary ﬂows to politicians are called corruption. More precisely,
corruption is a situation, in which a bureaucrat takes an action in exchange for
some hidden monetary payment.
Economists can approach the issue of donations to politicians in a completely
diﬀerent way. Banning monetary transfers to politicians is equivalent to restrict-
ing transactions in the market of political decision-making and ineﬃciencies can
arise exactly because of these constraints. This is an argument supporting the
view that donations to politicians should not be limited.
As it can be seen, the issue of monetary donations to politicians and bureau-
crats is a controversial one and as such, it is a fertile area of research. Aspects of
the problem have been addressed both on the theoretical and the empirical side.
In particular, empirical literature on corruption (see Mauro (1995)) has found
a negative link between corruption and growth, which means that corruption
impedes eﬃcient economic performance and it is socially ineﬃcient.
The theoretical literature has not yet been able to provide a uniﬁed treat-
ment of donations to politicians and bureaucrats and therefore, diﬀerent papers
analyze diﬀerent situations in which monetary transfers may occur.
One of the most developed area of research looks at campaign ﬁnancing
donations and lobbying (see Besley-Coate (2001) and Coate and Morris (1995)
and Pratt (2002)). The aim of monetary transfers in these cases is to improve the
electoral chances of political candidates with similar preferences. As lobbying
and campaign ﬁnancing donations are allowed for in many countries, this strand
of research is least relevant for our purpose.
More close to our interest is the literature on monetary ﬂows other than
compaign ﬁnancing donations and lobbying. In some situations the decision
taken by a bureaucrat aﬀects the wellbeing of more than one player. In some
cases, the bureaucrat has to decide about awarding a government contract to
1see Austen-Smith (1995)
2private sector agents and it is in the applicants’ interest to inﬂuence bureaucrats’
decisionmaking (see Rose-Ackerman (1975)). In other cases, a benevolent gov-
ernment wants to correct some existing market failure and corruption arises as
a consequence of agency problems within the government (see Banerjee (1997)
and Acemoglu-Verdier (2000)).
In other instances, a particular decision taken by the bureaucrat aﬀects the
wellbeing of just one player (e.g. a ﬁrm). One common example is tax collection,
when the bureaucrat can be bribed to misreport the ﬁrm’s proﬁt and make it pay
lower taxes (see Tirole (1992)). In other cases, the government has the task of
issuing licences and the bureaucrat may decide to set a price for licences (bribe)
and restrict the number of licenses issued (see Shleifer and Vishny (1993)).
Most of the theoretical work on money ﬂows to politicians looks at these
t r a n s f e r sa sb e i n gi n e ﬃcient and develop a theory of second best2 to derive the
equilibrium value of corruption3. However, no theoretical foundation for why
these transfers are necessarily ineﬃcient is provided.
Some of the papers realize the importance of the agency relationship between
the government and its bureaucrats. In this framework, the bargaining power
is given to the bureaucrat in his private (possibly hidden) relationship with the
private sector agents who are willing to buy some favours from him. This is a
correct assumption for situations, in which the government wants to award a
contract or wants to correct market failure. However, in some other situations,
like tax collection or a private ﬁrm contacting an bureaucrat with some speciﬁc
request (e.g. a license or overlooking anticompetitive behavior), i.e. situations
in which this realtionship is not initiated by the bureaucrat, the bargaining
power allocated to the private ﬁrm might be a better approach. This is even
more so, because in most cases the outside parties contacting a bureaucrat can
observe his existing relationship with the government.
In our paper we build a model in which bargaining power in the relation-
ship between private ﬁrm and bureaucrat is given to the ﬁrm. In particular,
we examine the eﬀect of monetary transfers to bureaucrat in a common agency
framework, in which the bureaucrat acts as a common agent of the government
and a ﬁrm (possibly a private ﬁrm). In this inﬂuencing game, principals move
sequentially, i.e. when the private ﬁrm wants to set up a deal with the bureau-
crat, the latter’s contract with the government is already ﬁxed. By analyzing
this common agency game, we derive conditions under which it is socially eﬃ-
cient for the government to ban monetary transfers paid to bureaucrats. We
also model the case, when legal bans on donations to politicians are not fully
eﬀective or enforceable, i.e. monetary transfers still can occur secretly, and show
that these money ﬂows lead to economic ineﬃciencies.
The sequence of action in our inﬂuencing game is as follows. The government
delegates some of its tasks to an bureaucrat, the actions of whom it cannot
costlessly observe4. After being appointed by the government, the bureaucrat
2or a general equilibrium theory in earlier papers.
3These papers often provide some mostly institutional remedies to reduce the equilibrium
amount of corruption.
4For the ease of exposition, we will use the pronoun "he" for the oﬃcial, "she" for the third
3may be contacted by a ﬁrm. The ﬁrm has an objective function that diﬀers
from the one of the government. As a result, it might be in her interest to use
some monetary resources to inﬂuence the bureaucrat’s decision.
We also assume that when the government appoints the bureaucrat, it has to
take into account that third parties may want to contact him later on. Depend-
ing on what the government knows about these third parties, it may or may not
forbid the bureaucrats to interact with them. It also has to take into account
that even if it bans this type of interactions, they might occur secretly. The
government includes its possible exclusivity requirement in its contract with the
bureaucrat. However, these exclusivity requirements are not always eﬀective,
as secret relationships with the ﬁrm still may occur. To be able to assess the
consequences of this enforcement failure, we analyze both cases when costless
enforcement of exclusivity is and is not possible.
First, we investigate the case when the government is able to enforce ex-
clusivity (eﬀective exclusivity) and derive conditions under which it is optimal
for the government to impose it. In particular, when the objectives of the gov-
ernment and the ﬁrm are similar, the government will be indiﬀerent between
imposing exclusivity or not. The ﬁrm will not choose to contact the bureaucrat
in this case as she can free-ride on the government. Even though the government
moves ﬁrst, it cannot freeride on the ﬁrm as the latter one cannot be forced to
enter the game. When the diﬀerence between the objectives of the ﬁrm and the
government is of medium degree, it might be in the interest of the government
to require exclusivity from the bureaucrat. The reason for this is that in this
case, it will be in the ﬁrm’s interest to contact the bureaucrat, however, the
surplus created (and extracted by the government) by this interaction will be
smaller than what the government could get by imposing exclusivity. Finally,
when the objectives of the ﬁrm and the government are very diﬀerent, it might
be in the government’s interest to allow for non-exclusivity and as a ﬁrst mover,
to extract the large surplus the ﬁrm can obtain from contacting the bureaucrat.
T h em o r eg e n e r a lﬁnding here is that exclusivity might increase the players
total surplus, when the contract between one principal and the agent inﬂuences
the terms of the contract between the other principal and the agent. In partic-
ular, if these contractual externalities are strongly negative, exclusion might be
welfare enhancing5. We show that with all the players being risk neutral, the
government can implement the socially eﬃcient outcome and in some cases, it is
eﬃcient for the government to impose a ban on contracting with third parties.
Second, we investigate the case when the government is not able to enforce
exclusivity (non-enforceable exclusivity). In this scenario, the bureaucrat may
choose to accept hidden donations from the ﬁrm. The government can forecast
secret money ﬂows and it may choose to launch a costly investigation and punish
the other two parties if they are found to be guilty. By analyzing this scenario,
we ﬁnd that eﬃciency can be assured in many cases, both when the government’s
party intending to inﬂuence his choices (this is a tradition in principal-agent relationships)
and "it" for the government.
5This idea of welfare enhancing exclusivity is borrowed from Bernheim and Whinston
(1998).
4and the ﬁrm’s objectives are very similar (with exclusivity and non-exclusivity
leading to the same outcome) or are very diﬀerent (non-exclusivity chosen in-
dependently of whether exclusivity can or cannot be imposed).
We ﬁnd that eﬃciency fails in the case when the diﬀerence between the gov-
ernment’s and the bureaucrat’s objectives is of medium degree. In one case,
when this diﬀerence is lower within this medium range, the ﬁrm will choose
to occasionally inﬂuence the bureaucrat’s decision, even if she might be caught
and punished. However, the gains from such an inﬂuencing activity are not
large enough (the ﬁrm does not even choose to always inﬂuence the bureau-
crat) to compensate the government for the losses that it incurs when opting
for non-exclusivity. Because of this, the government will try to ban this type
of contracting in the hope that a ban (with the consequence of possible punish-
ment) will lower the ﬁrm’s incentives to contact the agent. Exclusivity will be
chosen in the case of no secret contracting as well, and the source of ineﬃciency
is that the agent will choose diﬀerent actions in the secret contracting and the
no secret contracting case.
The other case when ineﬃciency can arise is when the conﬂict of interest be-
tween the government and the ﬁrm is higher within the medium range mentioned
above. The incentives of the ﬁrm to inﬂuence the bureaucrat are stronger than
previously, and it is in the interest of the government to choose non-exclusivity
as it can extract all the surplus of the ﬁrm and it also knows that it would not
be able to costlessly enforce exclusivity. In the no secret contracting case, the
government will still opt for exclusivity as the possibility of secret contracting
will not erode its power. So, in this case, not only the bureaucrat will take diﬀer-
ent actions compared to the case of no secret contracting, but the government’s
decision about exclusivity will diﬀer too.
As a result, we ﬁnd circumstances under which the inﬂuencing game with
non-enforceable exclusivity can lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. In this
cases secret contracting between the ﬁrm and the bureaucrat may occur and it is
sometimes discovered. Observe that these are exactly the features of corruption
and our story supports the idea that donations to bureaucrats should be banned
in some cases and that non-enforceable ban can lead to economic ineﬃciencies,
i.e. corruption destroys social eﬃciency.
There are two key features of our model. First, the interaction between the
government and ﬁrm via the bureaucrat gives rise to contractual externalities
among them in the sense that the contract between the government and the
bureaucrat aﬀects the terms of the optimal contracts between the ﬁrm and the
bureaucrat and vice versa. According to Bernheim and Whinston (1998), exclu-
sivity can be welfare enhancing if these contractual externalities are negative.
This result helps us to argue that under some conditions it is socially optimal
for the government to forbid its bureaucrat to accept monetary transfers from
outside parties.
Second, we assume that secret donations to the bureaucrat can occur even if
that has been previously forbidden by the government. Under some conditions,
this distorts the contract choice of the government as the possibility for secret
contracting between the ﬁrm and the bureaucrat puts an additional constraint
5on the government’s optimization problem and as a result, the socially eﬃcient
solution cannot be achieved. This is exactly what happens in cases of corrup-
tion and our theory supports the view that corruption indeed leads economic
ineﬃciency.
It is exactly these two features that are necessary to explain corruption.
Without these two features, we are in the world described by Bernheim and
Whinston (1986) who claim that with no contractual externalities (feature 1)
and observable contracts (feature 2) the total joint surplus of the players (prin-
cipals and agent) can be maximized, i.e. social eﬃciency can be achieved.
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. We introduce the elements of
our model in Section 2. We derive and characterize the equilibrium of the game
when exclusivity can be costlessly enforced and no secret contracting occurs in
Section 3. We perform the same analysis for the case when secret contracting
can occur in Section 4 and we conclude in Section 5.
2 The model
We analyze a model in which a ﬁrm wants to inﬂuence the actions taken by a
bureaucrat. The details of the economic environment are as follows.
The government represents the aggregate welfare of the society in the sense
that its payoﬀs coincides with the values of the aggregate social welfare6 and
it delegates some of its tasks to an bureaucrat. Also assume that there is
uncertainty in this environment, in the sense that two states of the world can
occur. Denote state 1 as the "good" state and state 2 as the "bad" state as the
payoﬀ of the government (and that of the social welfare) is higher in state 1.
The bureaucrat’s task is to choose the probability of the good state to occur.
Assume that he has to make a binary choice, i.e. pick a probability p from the
set {p,p} ( p,p ∈ (0,1) and p < p) of the good state (state 1) to occur.
The terms of the contract oﬀered to the bureaucrat are designed by the
government. The bureaucrat acts as the agent of the government. The principal-
agent relationship between the two of them has three speciﬁcf e a t u r e s .
First, because of high monitoring costs, the government is not able to per-
fectly observe the actions of the bureaucrat, it can only observe the state of the
world realized, which is in turn inﬂuenced by the agent’s action.
Second, the government oﬀers a ﬂat wage payment to the bureaucrat. This
assumption can be justiﬁed by the fact that elements of the bureaucrats’ work
(involving a series of activities and decisions) are hard to measuregenerally.
The third speciﬁc feature of this principal-agent relationship is that it in-
volves the possibility of reputation building by the bureaucrat. In particular,
the occurrence of state 1 (the good state) increases his opportunities of receiving
better jobs or promotions in the future7.
6including that of the third party as well.
7see Tirole (1994) for a comprehensive discussion of the role of soft incentives (ﬂat wage)
and reputation within government agencies.
6The beneﬁts of the bureaucrat are thus twofold: he receives a ﬂat wage from
the government and he can derive a reputation rent when the good state of the
world occurs. On the cost side, one can assume that there is no diﬀerence in
the cost of choosing any particular value of the probability of the good state
to occur. This assumption can be justiﬁed by the fact that even though it is
costly for the bureaucrat to gather information to prepare a given decision, the
cost of decision-making itself does not depend on the outcome of the decision.
Therefore, there is no loss of generality in normalizing the costs of the bureaucrat
to zero.
The expected utility of the bureaucrat in this simple setup can be written
as
u = wg + pA (1)
where wg denotes the ﬂat wage received from the government and A is a positive
real number quantifying the reputation rent of the bureaucrat in the good state8.
The expected payoﬀ of the government can be written as
vg = pq
g
1 +( 1− p)q
g









2, denoting the government’s
payoﬀs in the good state and the bad state, respectively. Players are risk neutral
in this setup because we would like to focus on issues other than risk-sharing.
Extend this setup by including a ﬁrm who wants to inﬂuence the decisions
taken by the bureaucrat by monetary means. Interacting with the ﬁrm may
distort the decision of the bureaucrat from what the government would like to
obtain. As a result, the government may choose to put a ban on this type of
interactions. One of our main assumption is that this type of interactions might
occur even if the government forbids them, they just happen secretly.
The ﬁrm’s payoﬀs also depend on the state of the world and it might be in
her interest to try to inﬂuence the bureaucrat’s actions using monetary transfers.
Because of this, the interaction between the ﬁrm and the bureaucrat can also be
modelled as a principal-agent relationship, in which the former is the principal
and the latter is the agent9.
However, there are two diﬀerences between the two relationships the bu-
reaucrat becomes involved in. First, the ﬁrm is able to observe the bureaucrat’s
action. This is not a crucial assumption from the technical point of view, but
we think that when a ﬁrm wants to inﬂuence the decision of a bureaucrat on a
particular issue, she is well informed about that issue and in many cases joint
consultations are often part of their interaction. Second, since the agreement
between the ﬁrm and the bureaucrat might be secret (and illegal), its terms can-
not be enforced by law. We solve this problem by allowing for some exogenous
8I nt h eb a ds t a t eh ed o e sn o td e r i v ea n yr e p u t a t i o nr e n t .
9We shortly discussed the choice of allocating the bargaining power to the third party in
the introduction. In particular, we justify this choice by the fact that in many cases it is
generally the third party who contacts the government oﬃcial in a particular issue and not
the bureaucrat is holding an auction to receive some compensation in exchange for favours.
7reputation mechanism10 to control for the two parties’ behavior.
Assume therefore that the payoﬀso ft h eﬁrm depend on the state of the
world and the only cost it incurs is the choice contingent monetary transfer
paid to the bureaucrat. The ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ can be written as
vf = pq
f
1 +( 1− p)q
f





2 are real numbers denoting the ﬁrm’s payoﬀs in state 1 (the
good state) and state 2 (the bad state) and wf(p) denotes the choice contingent
wage paid to the bureaucrat. By taking into account a possible interaction with
a ﬁrm, the expected payoﬀ of the bureaucrat has to be rewritten as
u = wg + wf(p)+pA (4)
The bureaucrat has a reservation utility value denoted by u0 for the case of
not accepting the contract oﬀered by the government.
It can be seen that in the extended model the bureaucrat acts as a common
agent of the government and the ﬁrm. As a result, the interaction of the three
players can be modelled as a common agency game with the principals moving
sequentially. The timing of this inﬂuencing game is the following.
In the ﬁrst stage, the government oﬀers an exclusive or a non-exclusive con-
tract to a future bureaucrat who decides whether to accept that contract or
not.
In the second stage, the ﬁrm observes the contract between the government
and the bureaucrat11 and decides whether to oﬀer a contract to the bureaucrat
or not.
In the third stage, the bureaucrat decides whether to accept or not the
contract oﬀered by the ﬁrm. Afterwards, he takes an action, i.e. he chooses the
probability of the good state to occur. After the choice of the bureaucrat, the
state of the nature realizes.
In the fourth stage, the government - provided that it chose an exclusive
contract in the ﬁrst stage -, decides whether to conduct a costly investigation or
not to discover whether secret contracting between the ﬁrm and the bureaucrat
occurred. If an investigation ﬁnds the other two parties guilty, they will be
punished. Finally, payoﬀs are realized.
Observe that the payoﬀ structure of the players in (1)-(4) does not contain
any elements of the ﬁrm’s (possibly) random choice whether to oﬀer a contract
to the bureaucrat, of the government’s decision to launch an investigation or
of the agent having an expected utility under exclusivity with separate terms
for both cases of being oﬀered a contract by the ﬁrm or not. We will formalize
these elements later on in the paper.
10For example, if the third party does not make the money transfer in compensation for a
decision favourable for her, she will risk that the oﬃcial will never act in her favour in the
future. Alternatively, if the oﬃcial does not deliver the right decision, he risks of not being
contacted later on in his work. However, this mechanism is observed to work well in some
cases, and less well in others (see Shleifer and Vishny (1993) for a short discussion).
11The main terms (e.g. salary) of these contracts are generally public or are common
knowledge.
8Before starting the equilibrium analysis, some additional clarifying remarks
have to be done. First, the assumption that the government cannot observe the
actions of the bureaucrat is essential because if the action chosen by the bureau-
crat would be perfectly observable by the government, it could immediately ﬁnd
out whether subsequent contracting between the ﬁrm and the bureaucrat oc-
curred. In that case the ﬁrm will always be punished when contracting with the
bureaucrat and as a result, this type of contracts might be completely eliminated
and no secret inﬂuence activity by the ﬁrm (corruption) will take place.
Second, imposing risk neutrality for the bureaucrat is without loss of gen-
erality as we would like to identify forces other than risk sharing in explaining
inﬂuencing practices. In addition, risk neutrality implies transferable utilities
which allows us to assume that when caught of secretly contracting, only the
ﬁrm will be punished12.
The assumption of the ﬁrm’s payoﬀs to be common knowledge is not restric-
tive as it only abstracts from information rent issues that are well documented
in the information economics literature.
Now we can turn to analyze the common agency game between the govern-
ment, the bureaucrat and the ﬁrm. In the next section we analyze the game in
w h i c ht h eg o v e r n m e n tc a ne ﬀectively ban contracting between the bureaucrat
and the ﬁrm if it chooses so. The analysis of this simpler game provides a ﬁrst
insight into the mechanisms at work and also helps to derive the socially optimal
outcome of the inﬂuencing game. Then we turn to the analysis of the inﬂuencing
game with non-enforceable exclusivity in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
3 The benchmark case - No secret contracting
In this section we analyze the case when the government is able to enforce a
ban on contracting between the bureaucrat and the ﬁrm at zero cost. This
case explains the motivation of the government to require exclusivity from its
bureaucrat and it also provides important guidelines to evaluate the eﬃciency
of the various contractual arrangements13. We can turn afterwards in Section 4
to analyze the case when the government is not able to enforce such bans.
The timing in this simpler game is as follows.
In the ﬁrst stage, the government oﬀers an exclusive or a non-exclusive con-
tract to an bureaucrat.
In the second stage, the ﬁrm observes this contract and if it is non-exclusive
she decides whether to oﬀer a contract to the bureaucrat or not.
In the third stage, the bureaucrat decides whether to accept or not the
contract oﬀered by the ﬁrm. Then, he takes an action, i.e. he chooses the
12If the agent would be punished as well, the payment made by the third party should be
increased by this amount to compensate the agent for expected loss, which is identical to the
third party paying a punishment that is higher by the amount of the oﬃcial’s punishment.
13Our analysis resembles some of the results obtained in Bernheim and Whinston’s (1998)
seminal work on exclusive dealing.
9probability of the good state to occur. Afterwards, the state of the nature
realizes.
In the fourth stage, payoﬀs are realized.
This simpler game is still a common agency game, with the principals moving
sequentially. The strategy sets of the players can be identiﬁed as follows. The
government has to make an exclusivity decision and to choose a wage (which
is not state-dependent) afterwards. Its strategy set therefore contains the set
{E,NE} and the set Wg of functions wg : {E,NE} → R+. The strategy of the
ﬁrm involves choosing an action-contingent payment to the bureaucrat when
the government opts for non-exclusivity, so her strategy space is the set wf of
functions wf : R+ ×{E,NE}×P → R,w h e r eP = {p,p} and wf(R+,E,P)=
0. Finally, the bureaucrat’s strategy space is the set of functions p : R+ ×
{E,NE}×wf → P.
The equilibrium of this inﬂuencing game Γ1 is a probability p chosen by the
bureaucrat and a set of contracts chosen by the government and the ﬁrm such
that the chosen probability maximizes the utility of the bureaucrat, taken the
contracts he is oﬀered as given, whereas the contracts chosen by the government
and the ﬁrm maximizes their objective function subject to the probability chosen
by the agent and the contract chosen by the other principal. The following
deﬁnition formalizes the equilibrium concept.
Deﬁnition 1 A pure strategy equilibrium of the inﬂuencing game Γ1 is a vector
{b e, b wg, b wf, b p},s u c ht h a t
1, for every b wf ∈ wf and b p ∈ P,
(b e, b wg) ∈ arg max
e,wg(e)
©
b p(e,wg(e), b wf(wg(e),e,b p))q
g
1+





2, for every (NE, b wg) ∈ {E,NE}×Wg and b p ∈ P,
b wf ∈ argmax
wf
n
b p(NE, b wg,wf)q
f





3, for every (b e, b wg) ∈ {E,NE}×Wg and b wf ∈ wf,
b p ∈ argmax
p
©
b wg + b wf(b e, b wg,p)+pA
ª
(7)
Since the principals move sequentially in this game, the equilibrium of the
game can be found by backward induction. Remember, that the optimization
of the government includes an exclusivity choice. Since this is the ﬁrst choice
made in the game, we split the game Γ1 into two subgames: Γe
1, the subgame
when government requires exclusivity from the bureaucrat, and Γne
1 ,i nw h i c h
contracting with the ﬁrm is allowed. We analyze the optimal contracts in the
two subgames and derive conditions that drive the government’s exclusivity
decision.
The following proposition summarizes the outcome of the subgame when
exclusivity is imposed eﬀectively, i.e. no secret contracting occurs.
10Proposition 1 The choice of p is always implemented in the subgame with
exclusive contracting and the equilibrium outcomes are as follows:
1, the bureaucrat’s utility is kept at its reservation level u0.
2, the ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ is
vf = pq
f
1 +( 1− p)q
f
2 (8)
3, the government’s expected payoﬀ is
vg = pq
g
1 +( 1− p)q
g
2 − u0 + pA (9)
Proof. See Appendix.
The results in Proposition 1 can be easily understood. There is no conﬂict
of interest between the government and the bureaucrat as both of them derives
higher expected utility net of payments from the bureaucrat choosing proba-
bility p. Since both of them are risk neutral, they can maximize their joint
surplus14 even if the action taken by the bureaucrat is not directly observed by
the government and the latter is able to extract all the surplus from the former.
The ﬁrm is a passive player in this game, so she does not make and receive any
monetary payment. Her payoﬀ is given by equation (8). One should note here
that the payoﬀ in equation (8) will act as a reservation payoﬀ for the ﬁrm in the
subgame with non-exclusive contracting since she can always get this payoﬀ by
not oﬀering a contract to the bureaucrat15.
T h ec a s eo fn o n - e x c l u s i v ec o n t r a c to ﬀered by the government is more com-
plex. As the government moves ﬁrst by setting the value of the wage paid to
the bureaucrat at wg,t h eﬁrm makes her decision taking this value as given. As
wg will not change in response to the bureaucrat’s action, she is basically facing
a simple agency problem when designing the optimal incentive scheme for the
















It can be seen that the wage paid by the government only shifts the bureau-
crat’s reservation utility value, and as such, it cannot inﬂuence the choice of
p.
Lemma 1 In the subgame with non-exclusivity, the action chosen by the bureau-
crat is only inﬂuenced by the ﬁrm. In particular, p is chosen in the equilibrium





2 ≥− A (11)
14F i r s t - b e s tc a nb ea c h i e v e db ys e l l i n gt h eﬁrm to the agent.
15The government will not able to unilaterally manipulate this incentive by setting the wage
wg at a low level, because if the third party will choose to stay passive, the oﬃcial will have
an incentive to choose p.
11The transfer paid by the ﬁrm to the bureaucrat is equal to
wf(p)=u0 − pA − wg (12)
Proof. See Appendix.
Recall that the distinction between the good state and the bad state was
arbitrary. State 1 was chosen to be the good state because we assumed that
the payoﬀ of the government (which is supposed to represent aggregate social




2. As a result, the condition described
in Lemma 1 can be interpreted as follows: If the conﬂict of interest between the




2 is also positive or does
not have a large negative value), then the government’s optimal choice, p, will
be implemented, or, in other words, it doesn’t pay oﬀ for the ﬁrm to induce the
bureaucrat to choose an action that he favours less, since her payoﬀ in state 2
is not suﬃciently high relative to the payoﬀ in state 1 to compensate him for
the increased agency costs.
So, the equilibrium value of p will depend only on the ﬁrm’s payoﬀsi nt h e
two states of the world and since these two values are known to the government,
it can calculate the equilibrium value of p in advance. The only tool of the
government in this subgame is setting the value of wg. One can see that the
higher wg, the lower the wage paid by the ﬁrm has to be in order to keep the
bureaucrat at his reservation utility. As a result, the government can use wg to
extract surplus from the ﬁrm. In particular, the lower wg,t h em o r et h eﬁrm has
to pay to the bureaucrat to keep him at his reservation utility, and the lower
the ﬁrm’s surplus. However, there is a lower bound on the ﬁrm’s surplus. In
particular, the ﬁrm must be assured an expected payoﬀ not lower than the one in
equation (8) in order to induce her to participate in the game. The equilibrium
outcome of the subgame with non-exclusivity is as follows.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium outcome and the payoﬀs in the subgame with
non-exclusivity are as follows:
1, The bureaucrat’s utility is kept at its reservation level u0.
2, The ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ is also kept at its reservation level given by
equation (8).
3, The bureaucrat’s equilibrium action and the government’s payoﬀ depend
on the ﬁrm’s payoﬀs in the two states of the world. In particular:
i, if condition (11) holds, the bureaucrat chooses
p = p (13)
and the equilibrium payoﬀ of the government is equal to
vg = pq
g
1 +( 1− p)q
g
2 − u0 + pA (14)
ii, of condition (11) does not hold, the bureaucrat chooses
p = p (15)
12and the equilibrium payoﬀ of the government is equal to
vg = pq
g
1 +( 1− p)q
g






The next step of our analysis is to identify the set of conditions that drive
the government’s exclusivity decision. Compare the government’s payoﬀs under
both regimes, i.e. to compare the expressions in equation (9), (14) and (16).
Observe that the expressions in equations (9) and (14) are the same. The reason
is that the equilibrium action of the bureaucrat is the same in the two cases and
the ﬁrm is kept at the same payoﬀ in both cases. In the ﬁrst case, she is a
passive player and receives her reservation expected payoﬀ. In the second case,
all her surplus is transferred to the government via the wage wg, and as a result
she will act like an intermediary agent of no use and no harm. This means that
under condition (11), the government is indiﬀerent between oﬀering an exclusive
or a non-exclusive contract to the bureaucrat.
When condition (11) does not hold, exclusivity and non-exclusivity are not
any more equivalent for the government. The following theorem summarizes
the conditions for exclusivity to be optimal.
Theorem 1 The government’s incentives to oﬀer exclusive contract to the bu-
reaucrat can be summarized as follows:
1, If condition (11) holds, the government is indiﬀerent between exclusivity
and non-exclusivity.
2, If condition (11) does not hold, the government will opt for exclusivity for











Condition (17) provides an important insight. When the magnitude of the
conﬂict between the objectives of the government and the ﬁrm passes a certain
limit, i.e. condition (11) fails to hold, the ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ is higher when
she can inﬂuence the bureaucrat to choose his less preferred action (p). However,
when the diﬀerence between the objectives of the two is not vary large, i.e.
condition (17) holds as well, this gain in the expected payoﬀ of the ﬁrm will
be less than the loss in the expected payoﬀ of the government when it allows
for non-exclusivity and the bureaucrat chooses his less preferred action. In this
case it is optimal for the government to choose exclusivity.
However, when the conﬂict of interest between the government and the ﬁrm
is very high, i.e. condition (17) is violated too, the surplus created by the ﬁrm
from inﬂuencing the bureaucrat becomes large enough to even compensate the
government for switching to non-exclusivity.
Observe too, that under exclusive contracting, the government is able to
extract all the surplus of the bureaucrat (above the reservation level), whereas
13under non-exclusive contracting it is the ﬁrm who is able to extract all the sur-
plus of the bureaucrat (above the reservation level) and the government is in
turn able to extract all the surplus of the ﬁrm (above the reservation level). As
a result, all the realized surplus goes to the government and the choice of exclu-
sivity by the government assures that the maximal joint surplus of the players
will be realized. It is interesting to see that under condition (17), imposing
exclusivity enhances the joint surplus of the players.
This idea, i.e. that exclusive dealing can enhance the total surplus of the
players is shown more generally in Bernheim and Whinston (1998). The main
idea behind this result is that contractual externalities might lead to ineﬃcien-




2 inﬂuences the contract that
the ﬁrm oﬀers to the bureaucrat. However, the terms of this contract aﬀects the
contract that the government oﬀers to the bureaucrat. In this sense there might
be negative contractual externalities be t w e e nt h ep r i n c i p a l s ,i nt h es e n s et h a t
under some conditions the government can make a higher payoﬀ with banning
contracting for the ﬁrm rather then allowing it.
This argument supports the idea that in some cases exclusivity will lead
to a higher joint surplus of the players and in turn a higher payoﬀ for the
government as it is able to extract all the surplus of the other two players.
Since the government is assumed to represent aggregate welfare, this means that
requiring exclusivity maximizes social welfare under condition (17). As a result,
a ban on subsequent contracting for bureaucrats can increase aggregate social
welfare and as such it can be rationalized. The following corollary formalizes
this idea.
Corollary 1 When there is no cost of enforcing exclusivity, the government can
always implement the socially eﬃcient outcome. In addition, if condition (17)
holds, this requires imposing exclusivity in the contracts oﬀered to bureaucrats.
We can now turn to the case when exclusivity cannot be costlessly enforced
and see how the statements of the theorem and its corollary change.
4 The case of secret contracting
Let us now investigate the case when secret contracting between the ﬁrm and the
bureaucrat may occur. In this case, the government cannot perfectly observe the
bureaucrat’s action, it can only draw inferences about possible secret contracting
by observing the realized state of the world. Since any investigation16 is costly
for the government, assume that it will launch on investigation only if state
2 (the state that gives it a lower payoﬀ) occurred. If an investigation ﬁnds
16From this point on, we use the worlds "secret contracting" for contracting between the
t h i r dp a r t ya n dt h eo ﬃcial that occured in spite of the ban imposed by the government, and
"investigation" for an investigation launched by the government to discover whether such
secret contracting occured or not.
14evidence of secret contracting, the ﬁrm will be punished17. The magnitude of
punishment, T, is taken to be exogenously ﬁxed by law.
Observe that the players in this game may make random choices, i.e. once
exclusivity is imposed by the government, the ﬁrm may choose not to always
oﬀer a contract to the bureaucrat, or the government might choose not to always
investigate. In particular, the ﬁrm oﬀers a contract to the bureaucrat with some
probability s and the government investigates with some probability t.T h i s
opens up the possibility of mixed strategy equilibria of the subgame in which
the government imposes exclusivity but cannot costlessly enforce it, so secret
contracting may occur.
The expected payoﬀs of the players when exclusivity is non-enforceable are
as follows. The expected payoﬀ of the bureaucrat can be written as
u = s[wg + wf(e p)+e pA]+( 1− s)[wg + p0A] (18)
where e p is the probability chosen by the bureaucrat under secret contracting
(which occurs with probability s)a n dp0 is the probability chosen when no
contract by the ﬁrm is oﬀered. The objective function of the ﬁrm when she
decides to oﬀer a contract to the bureaucrat has the following form
vf = pq
f
1 +( 1− p)(q
f
2 − tT) − wf(p) (19)
otherwise she receives her reservation value determined in equation (8). Observe
that the payoﬀ in state 2 (the bad state) is lowered by the expected amount of
punishment in case of government investigation. The overall objective function
of the ﬁrm that takes into account the choice of secretly oﬀering a contract to
the bureaucrat with probability s,c a nb ew r i t t e na s
vf = s[e pq
f
1 +( 1− e p)(q
f
2 − tT) − wf(e p)] + (1 − s)[p0q
f
1 +( 1− p0)q
f
2] (20)
Finally, the objective function of the government can be written as
vg =[ se p +( 1− s)p0]q
g
1 + t[s(1 − e p)+( 1− s)(1 − p0)](q
g
2 − c + sT)+
+(1 − t)[s(1 − e p)+( 1− s)(1 − p0)]q
g
2 − wg (21)
The terms of this expression can be understood as follows. State 1 of the
world occurs with probability e p when the ﬁrm oﬀers a contract to the bureaucrat
(and this occurs in turn with probability s) and with probability p0 when the
ﬁrm does not oﬀer a contract to the bureaucrat (with probability (1−s)). The
probability for state 2 to occur can be calculated in a similar way. In addition,
the government will launch an investigation in state 2 with probability t which
has a cost of c and has a return of T (the amount of the punishment)18 when
17We do not consider any other punisment mechanisms (e.g. ﬁring the oﬃcial or decreasing
the amount of reputational rent in the future) as all these punishment have a monetary
equivalent.
18A direct money transfer from the third party to the government in case of punishment
is a strong assumption. If the money that the third party has to pay if caught of bribing is
15evidence of secret contracting is found (with probability s). The government’s
o b j e c t i v ef u n c t i o nc a nb ew r i t t e ni nam o r ec o n c i s ef o r ma s
vg =[ se p+(1−s)p0]q
g
1 +[s(1− e p)+(1−s)(1−p0)][q
g
2 +t(−c+sT)]−wg (22)
Review shortly the timing of the game presented in Section 2.
In the ﬁrst stage, the government oﬀers an exclusive or a non-exclusive con-
tract to an bureaucrat.
In the second stage, after observing the contract between the government
and the bureaucrat, the ﬁrm chooses to oﬀer a contract to the bureaucrat with
some probability.
In the third stage, the bureaucrat takes an action and the state of the world
realizes.
In the fourth stage, the government chooses a probability to investigate
provided that it imposed exclusivity in the ﬁrst stage. If evidence of secret
contracting is found, the parties will be punished. Finally, payoﬀs are realized.
The strategy space of the players can be identiﬁed as follows.
The government has to make an exclusivity decision, to choose a wage
(which is not state-dependent) and a probability of investigation in state 2.
Its strategy set Wg therefore contains the set {E,NE}, and the set of functions
wg : {E,NE} → R+ and t : {E,NE} → [0,1],w i t ht(NE)=0 .T h e ﬁrm
has to choose a probability s to oﬀer a contract to the bureaucrat (this is a
secret contract when exclusivity is required by the government), and a state-
dependent payment schedule wf. Her strategy space wf contains the set of
functions s : R+ ×{ E,NE}×P → [0,1] and wf : R+ ×{ E,NE}×P → R,
where P = {p,p}. Finally, the bureaucrat’s strategy space P contains three
elements19,t h es e te P of functions, e p : R+ ×{ E,NE}×wf → P specifying
the action taken under contracting with the ﬁrm and the set P0 of functions
p0 : R+ ×{ E,NE} → P specifying the action taken when not contracting with
the ﬁrm.
The equilibrium of this contracting game Γ2 is a pair of probabilities (e p,p0)
chosen by the bureaucrat , and a set of contracts and a probability chosen
by both the government and the ﬁrm such that the chosen probability maxi-
mizes the utility of the bureaucrat, taken the contracts he is oﬀered as given,
whereas the contracts and the probabilities chosen by the government and the
ﬁrm maximizes their objective function subject to the probability chosen by the
bureaucrat and the contract and the probability chosen by the other principal.
The following deﬁnition formalizes the equilibrium concept.
Deﬁnition 2 An equilibrium of the contracting game Γ2 is a vector {b e, b wg,b t,b s, b wf,b e p, b p0},
such that
burned, our equilibrium does not work. However, this is an other extreme case. In the real
world, when a government is successful in discovering corruption, it can "score good points"
from the public, which means that the monetary equivalent of its payoﬀ in state 2 is strictly
higher than the actual payoﬀ less the cost of investigation, i.e. q
g
2 −c. Under this assumption
as l i g h t l yd i ﬀerent equilibrium than ours will emerge and the qualitative results remain the
same.
19Do not confuse the strategy space P of the oﬃcial with his choice set P = {p,p}.
161, for every (b s, b wf) ∈ wf and (b e p, b p0) ∈ P,
(b e, b wg,b t) ∈ arg max
e,wg(e),t(e)
n
[b sb e p(e,wg(e), b wf)+( 1− b s)b p0(e,wg(e))]q
g
1+
+[ b s(1 −b e p(e,wg(e), b wf)) + (1 − b s)(1 − b p0(e,wg(e)))][q
g
2 + t(−c + b sT)] − wg(e)
o
(23)
2, for every (b e, b wg,b t) ∈ Wg and (b e p, b p0) ∈ P,
(b s, b wf) ∈ argmax
s,wf
n
s[b e p(b e, b wg,w f)q
f
1 +( 1−b e p(b e, b wg,w f))(q
f
2 − b tT) − wf]+
+(1 − s)[b p0(b e)q
f





3, for every (b wg,b t) ∈ Wg and (b s, b wf) ∈ wf,
b e p ∈ argmax
e p
©
b wg + b wf(b e, b wg, e p)+e pA
ª
(25)
b p0 ∈ argmax
p0 {b wg + p0A} (26)
Similarly to the previous section, the principals move sequentially and the
equilibrium of the game can be found by backward induction. It also makes
sense, as before, to split the game into two subgames (Γe
2 and Γne
2 ), conditional
on whether the government chooses exclusivity or non-exclusivity in the ﬁrst
stage. The case of non-exclusivity, including the ﬁnal payoﬀso ft h ep l a y e r s ,i s
exactly the same as in the previous section and therefore, we only derive here
the equilibrium of subgame Γe
2. The analysis goes through the following steps:
Step 1. Analyze the bureaucrat’s actions e p and p0 and derive the wage paid
by the ﬁrm.
Step 2. Analyze the ﬁrm’s decision whether to contract with the bureaucrat
or not, taking the government’s decision about the probability to investigate as
given.
Step 3. Examine the government’s decision whether to investigate or not,
taking the ﬁrm’s decision whether to contract secretly or not as given.
Step 4. Solve for their optimal choice of these two probabilities.
The bureaucrat has to make a double choice, i.e. to choose a probability e p
when being oﬀered a contract and a probability p0 when not contracting with
the ﬁrm. In the latter case the bureaucrat receives only a ﬂat rate wage from
the government and his optimization problem can be written as
max
p0 {wg + p0A} (27)
Since the wage oﬀered by the government is not contingent on the chosen action,
the bureaucrat chooses
p0 = p (28)
17When contracting with the bureaucrat, the ﬁrm oﬀers a choice contingent







1 +( 1− e p)(q
f
2 − tT) − wf(e p)
o
(29)
s.t. e p ∈ argmax
e p
©
s[wg + wf(e p)+e pA]+( 1− s)[wg + p0A]
ª
The following lemma describes the bureaucrat’s optimal choice and the wage
that he receives from the ﬁrm.
Lemma 2 In the subgame with non-enforceable exclusive contracting, the ﬁrm
oﬀers the bureaucrat a payment schedule of the following form:
wf(e p)=−(e p − p)A +
1
s
(u0 − pA − wg) (30)





2 ≥− A − tT (31)
Proof. See Appendix.
It can be seen that the possibility of punishment lowers the ﬁrm’s expected
payoﬀ in state 2, and as a result, weakens her incentives to make the bureaucrat
to choose his less preferred action. By similar arguments to those in Section
3, the bureaucrat’s utility will be kept at its reservation value (at this stage
the equilibrium value of wg is not yet calculated). Similarly to Lemma 1, the
bureaucrat’s choice does not depend on the wage oﬀered by the government.
Beside designing a contract for the bureaucrat, the ﬁrm also has to choose a
probability s of oﬀering such a contract. In particular, she chooses a value for
s that maximizes her expected payoﬀ













By substituting p for p0 and rearranging, the ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ can be
rewritten as









The government’s best response strategy is to choose a value of t that maximizes
its expected payoﬀ function
vg =[ se p +( 1− s)p]q
g
1 +[ s(1 − e p)+( 1− s)(1 − p)][q
g
2 + t(−c + sT)] − wg (34)
The choices of t and s cannot be observed for the other party even though
they do not occur simultaneously. As a result, the interaction of the government
and the ﬁrm can be analyzed as a simultaneous game. The following lemma
presents the outcome of this game.
18Lemma 3 The equilibrium outcome (t,s) of the contracting-investigating sub-
game between the government and the ﬁrm depends on the parameters of the
model:






the game has a pure strategy equilibrium in which s =0and t =0 .
2, If condition (11) does not hold, the subgame has a mixed strategy equilib-
rium, in which











Some clarifying comments might help understanding the results in Lemma
3. Remember from Lemma 2, that the bureaucrat chooses e p = p in equilibrium
if and only if condition (31) holds. As a result, e p is a function of t, and this has
to be kept in mind when maximizing the ﬁrm’s objective function in (33), which




2 +A)/T. Observe that in the scenario with
fully mixed strategies, e p = p and inequality (31) does not hold.
The following proposition completes the analysis of subgame Γe
2 by deter-
mining the equilibrium wage oﬀered by the government to the bureaucrat and
writing down the payoﬀ structure of the players.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium outcome of the game with non-enforceable ex-
clusive contracting looks as follows:
1, The bureaucrat’s expected utility is always kept at its reservation level. He
is always choosing probability p of state 1 to occur when no contract is oﬀered to
him by the ﬁrm. However, when such contract is oﬀered, he chooses p if and only
if condition (11) holds. In addition, the wage paid to him by the government is
equal to
wg = u0 − pA (37)
2, The ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ is also kept at its reservation level given by
equation (8).
3, The bureaucrat’s equilibrium action and the government’s expected payoﬀ
depend on the ﬁrm’s payoﬀs in the two states of the world, in particular:
i, when condition (11) holds, the bureaucrat chooses
e p = p,p0 = p (38)
and the government’s expected payoﬀ is equal to
vg = pq
g
1 +( 1− p)q
g
2 − u0 + pA (39)
19ii, when condition (11) does not hold, the bureaucrat chooses
e p = p,p 0 = p (40)
and the equilibrium payoﬀ of the government is equal to
vg = pq
g
1 +( 1− p)q
g






The following theorem formulates conditions, under which it is optimal for
the government to require exclusivity from the bureaucrat, and as such it com-
pletes the analysis of the game in which secret contracting may occur in equi-
librium.
Theorem 2 The government’s incentives to oﬀer exclusive contract to the bu-
reaucrat can be summarized as follows:
1, If condition (11) holds, the government is indiﬀerent between providing
an exclusive or non-exclusive contract to the bureaucrat.
2, If condition (11) does not hold, the government will opt for exclusive











Comparing our results in Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, we can set up conditions
under which the possibility of secret contracting destroys the eﬃciency results
formulated in Corollary 1.












the government will opt for exclusivity even if it is costly to enforce it. The
bureaucrat chooses e p = p when oﬀered a contract by the ﬁrm, as opposed to the
eﬃcient equilibrium outcome when he always chooses p = p.
ii, If













holds, the government chooses exclusivity when it can enforce it by no cost and
chooses non-exclusivity when it is costly to enforce exclusivity. Furthermore, the
bureaucrat chooses e p = p when oﬀered a contract by the ﬁrm, as opposed to the
eﬃcient equilibrium outcome of p = p.
20Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is the following. When the conﬂict of interest
between the government and the ﬁrm is small, the ﬁrm does not oﬀer any
contract to the agent, as he will choose his preferred action anyhow and it
would be to costly for her to induce a change.
When the conﬂict of interest between the government and the ﬁrm passes
a certain limit, i.e., inequality (43) holds, the ﬁrm’s incentives to inﬂuence the
bureaucrat’s decision become high enough so that she chooses to oﬀer a contract
to the bureaucrat even if she might be caught and punished. As the ﬁrm’s
incentives for contracting with the bureaucrat are not very strong yet (s<1), it
is worth for the government to stick to exclusivity as switching to non-exclusivity
will incur higher losses.
However, when the conﬂict of interest between the government and the ﬁrm
is even stronger, i.e. it is inequality (44) that holds, the incentives of the ﬁrm
to oﬀer a contract to the bureaucrat are much stronger, and it is in the interest
for the government to choose non-exclusivity as it can extract all the surplus of
the ﬁrm and it also knows that it is costly to enforce exclusivity. Note, that it
still would stick to exclusivity if it could enforce it at no cost.
Finally, when the conﬂict between the two principals is extremely high, it is
in the government’s interest to choose non-exclusivity even if it could enforce it
at no cost, as the gains from extracting the ﬁrm’s extra surplus from inducing
the bureaucrat to switch from his preferred choice, are larger than the beneﬁt
of sticking to the choice that would be optimal if there was no ﬁrm.
Theorem 3 also provides conditions under which it is in the government’s
interest to impose exclusivity, but secret contracting can occur in these cases
and that leads to social ineﬃciencies. Observe that this ﬁnding exactly supports
the idea that in some cases bureaucrats should be forbidden accepting monetary
donations from outside parties as they cause economic ineﬃciencies. However,
secret transfers may occur in this cases causing additional losses of eﬃciency.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
We analyzed the phenomenon of using monetary transfers to inﬂuence decisions
taken by bureaucrats in a common agency framework, in which a bureaucrat acts
as the common agent of the government and a ﬁrm. We identiﬁed conditions
under which it is eﬃcient for the government to forbid its bureaucrat to accept
money donations from third parties and also for what happens when the ban
imposed by the government can be circumvented by secret contracting. We
found that ineﬃciencies arise in the latter case and we suggested that our results
can be used to support the common view as well as empirical evidence that
bribing and corruption lead to economic ineﬃciency under certain conditions.
Our analysis can be extended in many ways. It might be interesting to
see how competition can enrich our results. First, it might be worth examing
21whether corruption can be reduced by introducing competition among bureau-
crats. Second, it would be interesting to look at the case when there are more
than one third parties and see how those results can be related to existing liter-
ature on the eﬀect of the market structure of the bribers market on corruption.
Testing some of the predictions of the model would also be a useful undertaking.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:




1 +( 1− p)q
g
2 − wg} (A.1)
s.t. max
p {wg + pA}
and the bureaucrat has a reservation utility of u0.
Since p>p ,i fwg is constant, the bureaucrat will always choose p.T h eg o v -
ernment still can extract all the surplus of the bureaucrat (above the reservation
level) by setting
wg = u0 − pA (A.2)
As a result, the payoﬀs in this game can be written as
vg = pq
g
1 +( 1− p)q
g
2 − u0 + pA
vf = pq
f





Proof of Lemma 1:
















and again, the bureaucrat has a reservation utility of u0.
22The optimal compensation scheme wf(p) has to be incentive compatible,
which means that if the ﬁrm wants to implement choice e p, the following, in-
equality must hold:
wg + wf(e p)+e pA ≥ wg + wf(p)+pA (A.5)
for each p ∈ {p,p}. For example, if the ﬁrm wants to implement p, the following
two conditions must hold:
pq
f
1 +( 1− p)q
f
2 − wf(p) ≥ pq
f
1 +( 1− p)q
f
2 − wf(p) (A.6)
and






2) ≥ wf(p) − wf(p) (A.8)
s.t. wf(p) − wf(p) ≥− (p − p)A
The second inequality will generally bind, so by substituting the LHS of the
second equation into the RHS of the ﬁrst equation, we get that the ﬁrm will





2) ≥− (p − p)A (A.9)
which is equivalent to the inequality in Lemma 1. By taking into account the
bureaucrat’s reservation utility, the optimal compensation schedule oﬀered by
the ﬁrm is equal to
wf(p)=u0 − pA − wg (A.10)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2:
By looking at the compensation schedule at the end of the proof of Lemma
1, it can be seen that the under non-exclusivity the ﬁrm is able to fully extract
the bureaucrat’s surplus, so his utility will be kept at the reservation level. As
a result, the ﬁrm’s objective function can be written as
vf = pq
f
1 +( 1− p)q
f
2 − u0 + pA + wg (A.11)
It can be seen that since the government oﬀers a ﬂat wage to the bureaucrat,
it cannot inﬂuence the ﬁrm’s decision of which p to implement. The best what
the government can do is do extract the surplus of the ﬁrm, above her reservation
level given by equation (9). This gives us the optimal wage chosen by the
government:





23in which the value of p is determined by the ﬁrm. As a result, if the ﬁrm chooses
to implement p, i.e. the condition in Lemma 1 holds, the payoﬀ function of the
government can be written as
vg = pq
f
1 +( 1− p)q
f
2 − u0 + pA (A.13)
whereas in the case when the condition in Lemma 1 does not hold, and the ﬁrm




1 +( 1− p)q
g






Proof of Theorem 1:
From the proofs of Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 it can be seen that
in the case when condition in Lemma 1 holds, and p is implemented under
non-exclusive contracting, the payoﬀ of the government coincides in the case
of exclusivity and non-exclusivity. As a result, it will be indiﬀerent between
banning contracting of the ﬁrm with the bureaucrat or not.
When condition in Lemma 1 does not hold, this indiﬀerence result will not
hold anymore. Comparing the objective functions of the government in this















After rearranging and simplifying by (p−p), a positive number, we get that the









2 + A ≥ 0 (A.16)
By rearranging this inequality we receive the condition stated in inequality (16)
in Theorem 1.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2:






1 +( 1− e p)(q
f






s[wg + wf(e p)+e pA]+( 1− s)[wg + p0A]
ª
and again, the bureaucrat has a reservation utility of u0.
24The optimal compensation scheme wf(p) has to be incentive compatible,
which means that if the ﬁrm wants to implement choice e p, the following, in-
equality must hold:
wg + wf(e p)+e pA ≥ wg + wf(p)+pA (A.18)
for each p ∈ {p,p}. For example, if the ﬁrm wants to implement p, the following
two conditions must hold:
pq
f
1 +( 1− p)(q
f
2 − tT) − wf(p) ≥ pq
f
1 +( 1− p)(q
f
2 − tT) − wf(p) (A.19)
and







2 + tT) ≥ wf(p) − wf(p) (A.21)
s.t. wf(p) − wf(p) ≥− (p − p)A
The second inequality will generally bind, so by substituting the RHS of the
second equation into the RHS of the ﬁrs equation, we get that the ﬁrm will





2 + tT) ≥− (p − p)A (A.22)
which is, after little manipulation, exactly equivalent to the inequality in Lemma
2. By taking into account the bureaucrat’s reservation utility and that p0 = p,
we can solve for the optimal compensation schedule oﬀered by the ﬁrm
wf(e p)=−(e p − p)A +
1
s
(u0 − pA − wg) (A.23)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3:
In order to derive the equilibrium of the choice of s and t,w en e e dt om a x i -
mize the ﬁrm’s and the government’s objective functions with respect to these
two variables. The ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ function is as in (33):










whereas the government’s expected payoﬀ is as in (34):
vg =[ se p+(1−s)p]q
g
1 +[s(1− e p)+(1−s)(1−p)][q
g
2 +t(−c+sT)]−wg (A.25)





2 ≥− A − tT (A.26)







In particular, when t ≥ t0, we have condition (31) to hold, which implies
that e p = p and as a result, the ﬁrst term inside the ﬁrst square bracket of vf
vanishes. Then the ﬁrm wants to maximize the following function
vf = −s(1 − p)tT +[ pq
f
1 +( 1− p)q
f
2] − (u0 − pA − wg) (A.27)
If, on the contrary, t<t 0, condition (31) does not hold, we have e p = p and
that implies that the ﬁrst term inside the ﬁrst square bracket of vf becomes
a strictly positive number. Then the ﬁrm wants to maximize the following
function




2 + A) − (1 − p)tT]+[ pq
f
1 +( 1− p)q
f
2] (A.28)




2 + A) by K
(K>0):
vf = s[K − (1 − p)tT]+[ pq
f
1 +( 1− p)q
f
2] (A.29)
To solve for the equilibrium we need to separate three cases, depending on
the position of t0 to 0 and 1.






T < 0.I nt h i sc a s ew ec e r t a i n l yh a v et ≥ t0, which implies
that the ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ function is given by (A.27).
If t>0,w eh a v es =0 , which in turn makes the government choose t =0 .
Contradiction.
If t =0 ,t h eﬁrm is indiﬀerent between choosing any value of s ∈ [0,1].T h e
government’s best response is to choose t =0when s<c / T,t oc h o o s et =1
when s>c / Tor to choose any value in the interval t ∈ [0,1] when s = c/T.T h e
equilibrium is t =0and s ∈ [0,c/T].T h eﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ is indiﬀerent
of s but the government’s expected payoﬀ is a decreasing function of s,s oa l l
the equilibria in which s ∈ (0,c/T] are Pareto-dominated by the one in which
s =0 , so we only keep this one.













T .I n t h i s c a s e t h e ﬁrm’s objective function is the one in
(A.29). Remember that K>0.
If K − (1 − p)tT > 0,w eh a v es =1 , which in turn makes the government
choose t =1 . However, this equilibrium only supports for t a maximum level






T − ε, so the government is not allowed to choose a level higher
than that. This equilibrium outcome is feasible only if K − (1 − p)tT > 0,









2 + A) > 0 a n dt h i si sn o tt r u e .
If K − (1 − p)tT < 0,w eh a v es =0 , which in turn makes the government
choose t =0 . This equilibrium is not feasible as K>0.
26If K − (1 − p)tT =0 . In this case it can be seen that the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent
between choosing any value of s ∈ [0,1]. The government’s best response is







T − ε (observe it is not allowed to choose t =1in this case) when




2 +A) (very special case,











s = c/T. This equilibrium is only feasible if K =( 1− p)tT, which implies that







T . In this case we have to look at (A.27) in investigating the
ﬁrm’s optimal choices.
As t>0 in this case, the ﬁrm chooses s =0 , which in turn makes the
government choose t =0 . Contradiction.






T > 1.I nt h i sc a s ew ec e r t a i n l yh a v et<t 0, which implies
that the ﬁrm’s expected payoﬀ function is given by (A.29).
If K − (1 − p)tT > 0,w eh a v es =1 , which in turn makes the government
choose t =1 . This equilibrium outcome is feasible only if K>(1 − p)T.
If K − (1 − p)tT < 0,w eh a v es =0 , which in turn makes the government
choose t =0 . This equilibrium is not feasible as K>0.
If K − (1 − p)tT =0 . In this case it can be seen that the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent
between choosing any value of s ∈ [0,1]. The government’s best response is
to choose t =0when s<c / T , which is not feasible as K>0), to choose
t =1when s>c / T, which is feasible only if K =( 1− p)T (very special case,
so we skip it) or to choose any value in the interval t ∈ [0,1] when s = c/T.
This equilibrium is only feasible if K =( 1− p)tT, which implies that we have
t = K/[(1 − p)T] in equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3:
The equilibrium values of e p and p0 have already been derived in equation
(28) and in Lemma 2. Lemma 3 indicates that the subgame between the gov-
ernment and the ﬁrm has two equilibria, one in pure strategies and one in mixed
strategies, depending on the parameters of the model. We are going t discuss





2 ≥− A.I nt h i sc a s e ,t =0 , s =0 , e p = p and p0 = p.
This means that the ﬁrm does not oﬀer a contract to the bureaucrat, and
the government has to consider only the outcomes of directly contracting with
the bureaucrat. In this case the wage it oﬀers the principal has to compensate
him for the choosing probability p, and it will be equal to
wg = u0 − pA (A.30)
27By substituting all these values in the ﬁrm’s objective function, it can be seen
that it will be equal to
vf = pq
f
1 +( 1− p)q
f
2 (A.31)
which is exactly her reservation value. In turn, the government’s expected payoﬀ
function can be written as
vg = pq
g
1 +( 1− p)q
g











(1−p)T , s = c/T, e p = p and
p0 = p.
The expected payoﬀ of the bureaucrat will be equal to
u = swf(p)+spA +( 1− s)pA + wg (A.33)
By substituting for wf(p) from (30), we get that the expected utility of the
bureaucrat will be kept at its reservation level again. The ﬁrm will be indiﬀerent
between oﬀering a contract to the bureaucrat or not if and only if her expected
payoﬀ will be the same with or without oﬀering a contact, i.e.
pq
f
1 +( 1− p)q
f
2 − (u0 − pA − wg)=pq
f
1 +( 1− p)q
f
2 (A.34)
which implies that the wage oﬀered by the government to the bureaucrat is the
same as in equation (A.30) and the expected payoﬀ of the ﬁrm is also kept at
its reservation level given by equation (A.31). By substitutinga l lt h e s ev a l u e s
into the government’s expected payoﬀ, we receive that it can will be equal to
vg = pq
g
1 +( 1− p)q
g






Proof of Theorem 2:
To derive the results of the theorem, compare the equilibrium outcomes from
Proposition 2 and 3. It can be seen that the two scenarios are separated by the
same condition (11) in both theorems. In particular, the expected payoﬀ of the
government is the same under non-exclusivity and non-enforceable exclusivity.
However, when condition (11) does not hold, the government chooses non-
enforceable exclusivity under the following condition
pq
g
1 +( 1− p)q
g







1 +( 1− p)q
g
















28Proof of Theorem 3:
It can be seen that the indiﬀerence results formulated in point 1, of Theorem
1 and Theorem 2, hold under the same condition (11), so no ineﬃciencies occur










2). In this case the eﬃcient solution
involves exclusive contracting in Theorem 1 with p = p. Exclusive contracting
prevails under the conditions of Theorem 2, with the one diﬀerence that e p = p,














2).I nt h i sc a s et h ee ﬃcient
solution involves exclusive contracting in Theorem 1 with p = p. However, the
government chooses non-exclusive contracting under the conditions of Theorem
2w i t hp = p.








2. Non-exclusive contracting with p = p will
be chosen by the government in both theorems, as a result, eﬃcient outcome is
feasible even if exclusivity cannot be imposed eﬃciently.
Q.E.D.
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